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1. Introduction 
In a frictionless world, like the one described by the Arrow-Debreu model, perfect 
and complete markets ensure a Pareto efficient allocation of resources. Yet financial 
markets and institutions experience a variety of frictions which give rise to significant 
constraints on firms’ strategies, welfare and efficiency. Two main (and closely related) 
channels exist through which financial frictions may manifest themselves in the banking 
system: informational and market structure imperfections. 
Typically, economists’ attention toward banking has focused on the informational 
role of banks, and in particular on the information asymmetry problems, i.e. adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and agency problems. The former is often referred to as the 
‘lemons’ problem (Akerlof, 1970) and can result in banks attracting the riskiest customers 
thus pushing up loan rates. On the other hand, moral hazard arises when a contract or 
financial arrangement creates incentives for one of the parties (e.g. the borrower) to behave 
against the interest of others (e.g. the bank). In addition, financial transactions often 
produce agency costs because the agent (manager) typically has superior information and 
expertise than the principal (shareholder). The theoretical literature suggests that 
information asymmetries and agency costs may not only reduce the incentives for 
managers to behave efficiently (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They may also significantly 
induce managers to undertake more risk and increase the cost of capital (see Jensen, 1986; 
Berger et al., 2008).  
Financial frictions affect banks’ asset quality directly, when moral hazard (e.g. in 
relation to deposit insurance), agency problems and market power encourage managers’ 
‘over-investing’ behaviour, thereby increasing the overall riskiness of a bank’s portfolio 
(Stulz, 1990; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). 
Indirectly, financial frictions affect lending quality when managers of inefficient banks 
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demonstrate poor credit scoring skills, inadequate asset underwriting, monitoring and 
control that may result in a relatively high proportion of loans reporting low or negative 
present value (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004).  
The literature concerning the effects of financial frictions in banking focuses either 
on informational or on market structure frictions. No work exists, as far as we are aware, 
examining the impact of both types of frictions on efficiency, simultaneously. This study’s 
main research objective is to fill this gap in the literature by examining the relationships 
between financial frictions, efficiency and risk using simultaneous equations models. 
Understanding these relationships has important policy implications because of banks’ 
‘specialness’, which makes them one of the most heavily regulated sectors in the economy, 
and in particular for the crucial role they have in financing businesses.  
Over the last two decades or so, the intensification of bank M&A activities and the 
resulting upsurge in concentration levels has raised concerns about managers’ incentives to 
operate efficiently while keeping high standards of safety and soundness. The dangers of a 
high-risk culture in banking were uncovered in the recent crisis and have generated a 
demand for the reassessment of the prudential rules currently in place (see e.g. G30, 2009 
and Acharya and Richardson, 2009). This means that post-crisis, banks will have to 
comply with a higher regulatory burden thus the evaluation of their operating efficiency 
will likely gain a new impetus, particularly on the cost side. In other words, the current 
developments motivate a further focus on cost efficiency as the asset side of banks’ 
balance sheets is under pressure and post-crisis banks will likely face tighter constraints in 
pursuing their profit maximisation objectives. 
In this paper, we consider an extended sample of commercial banks operating in the 
eurozone, which allows for an abundance of data pertaining to a relatively large number of 
banks that produce comparable products and use similar technologies. Moreover, to 
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distinguish between informational and market structure imperfections we test for the 
presence of reverse causation from efficiency to banks’ loan quality. Accordingly, we 
formulate two financial frictions hypotheses: the “agency costs hypothesis”, relating to 
moral hazard problems between shareholders and managers and banks and depositors; and 
the “quiet-life hypothesis”, which postulates that market structure imperfections result in 
lack of market discipline with adverse effects on bank efficiency and quality. Finally, we 
account for a possible reverse causation from performance to asset quality, a channel that 
we define the “efficiency-lending quality hypothesis”.  
The empirical results indicate that both channels of financial frictions are present in 
the euro area. Agency costs and lax market discipline in concentrated markets seem to 
precipitate a negative effect in banks’ operational efficiency. Recent research, however, 
indicates that the link between concentration and banking sector efficiency is not 
straightforward (Claessen and Laeven, 2004; and Casu and Girardone, 2006). Besides, 
increases in competition may not necessarily lead to more banking sector stability.1 Our 
results also indicate that low efficiency levels are a signal of poor asset quality loans, a 
result consistent with the efficiency-lending quality hypothesis. Finally, our findings 
broadly suggest that policies aimed at constraining banks’ degree of openness in the 
banking and financial system may ultimately direct the choices of bank management 
towards riskier investments.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 
3 specifies the simultaneous equations model for testing the hypotheses, explains how the 
efficiency and bank competition estimates were constructed, and describes the data 
employed in the model. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 In this context two views exist in the literature: the competition-fragility and the competition-stability (see 
Berger et al. 2009). 
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2. Literature review on financial frictions 
Over the past several years, two strands of literature have emerged as the most 
prominent in the field of financial institutions’ imperfections. One investigates the issue of 
informational frictions, arising from informational asymmetry and incomplete contracting 
(Section 2.1). A second strand of literature focuses on structural market imperfections 
arising from imperfect competition which may cause market power and lax market 
discipline in concentrated markets (Section 2.2). 
 
2.1 Informational frictions, bank efficiency and risk 
Financial theory suggests that, in a frictionless world with complete markets, capital 
structure does not affect a firm’s value or its cost of capital (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
In banking, though, capital structure matters more than in other industries because of 
informational failures, principal-agent issues, bankruptcy costs, taxes and regulation. 
Recent empirical evidence has shown that large banking institutions tend to hold capital in 
excess of even the most stringent regulatory requirements as a response to perceived risk 
exposure and in some cases with the aim of maintaining their future profit streams (Berger 
et al., 2008; Hellmann et al., 2000).  
The literature on informational frictions is copious. Leland and Pyle (1977) were 
among the first to propose a view of financial intermediaries as evaluators of financial 
signals and producers of information. Subsequent seminal studies focused on the imperfect 
information distribution between banks and borrowers, in the context of credit rationing 
models (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and Diamond, 1984, respectively). When the costs 
derived from the separation of bank ownership and control result in a conflict between 
shareholders and managers moral hazard emerges in the form of a principal-agent problem 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The principal-agent problem also arises between banks 
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and their customers and can extend to the conflicts between banks and governments, 
mainly as a result of regulatory safety nets. Explicit deposit insurance schemes and the 
availability of a lender of last resort can create moral hazard by reducing the incentive of 
depositors to monitor banks and rewarding imprudent banking practices (see for instance 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).   
Financial frictions, efficiency and lending quality are interconnected in several 
important ways. The theoretical literature suggests that information asymmetries may 
significantly induce managers to undertake more risk (for example, by investing in risky 
projects with negative net present value whenever there is free cash flow available) and 
increase the cost of capital. Risk-averse managers may seek to maximize their own 
compensation, indulging in perquisites and choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own 
preferences, thus failing to maximize firm value. Such behaviour can be encountered 
rather often in the case of banks, where information asymmetry is particularly acute as 
their assets are thought to be opaque (see Jensen, 1986; Stultz, 1990; Berger, 1995). Bank 
opacity particularly at large institutions is often thought to require special types of 
government regulation.2 However recent evidence on a sample of banks traded in the 
NYSE suggests that large banks have very similar trading properties as similar-sized non-
financial firms (Flannery et al., 2004).  
A related issue is that investing in risky assets inflates the problem of non-
performing loans. Moreover, as managerial compensation and power are typically linked 
to larger firm growth and size, managers are tempted to maximize firm growth beyond the 
efficient size. In the absence of market discipline mechanisms, managers of firms with 
                                                 
2 The opaqueness of banks’ assets has been the subject of many studies (e.g. Berlin and Loeys, 1988; 
Diamond, 1989, 1991; Kwan and Carleton, 2004). The argument is that bank assets are difficult to value for 
outside investors while bank insiders may possess valuable private information about the credit condition of 
customers’ loans or bank’s monitoring efforts. According to this position, effective market discipline relies 
on the ability of investors to receive adequate information regarding bank assets, thus alleviating agency 
costs by controlling managers and shareholders. 
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more market power may be allowed to pursue their own objectives, thus causing firms’ 
profitability to decline, as shown in Goddard et al. (2004). Several empirical studies focus 
on the impact of informational frictions on bank performance and on the relation between 
efficiency and the effects of the quality and riskiness of bank output. The bulk of empirical 
evidence generally finds that high capital ratios may prevent moral hazard between 
shareholders and managers, leading to more efficient banking institutions (Berger, 1995; 
Mester, 1996; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Other studies attempt to capture 
differences between risk, capitalization and measured efficiency (Berger et al., 1995; 
Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2007). These studies 
examine conflicts between shareholders and managers and usually support the notion that 
both efficiency and capital are relevant determinants of bank risk-taking and moral hazard 
incentives. A different approach to understanding managers’ behaviour has focused on 
examining the underlying relationships between problem loans and cost efficiency. The 
sign and direction of these relationships are viewed as evidence of specific types of 
management behaviour e.g. “skimping”, “bad management” and so on (see among others, 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004).  
Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, many researchers stress that financial 
frictions can force bank lending to be constrained by the supply of insured deposits. This 
may indicate the existence of a special lending channel with important implications for 
bank lending and aggregate economic activity (see among others Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995; Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 1997; Houston et al., 1997; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). On 
the other hand, a large number of empirical studies examine the implications of deposit 
insurance on bank stability and have found it to be an effective tool in the hands of policy-
makers for ensuring stability in the banking system and protecting depositors from 
 7
incurring large losses due to a bank failure (see among others, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998; 2002; Hovakimian et al., 2003).  
Yet the presence of deposit insurance, like other implicit and explicit safety-net 
government guarantees, can give rise to moral hazard problems between banks and 
depositors (see Calomiris, 1996 and Kane, 2000 for extensive reviews). Deposit insurance 
and high transparency can protect depositors, especially the smallest ones, and enhance 
competition in the banking industry by allowing small banks to compete with larger 
institutions for depositors. However, in a recent essay on the ethics of regulation and 
supervision, Kane (2009) highlights how, particularly in time of crises, safety-net subsidies 
disadvantage less-subsidised competitors and unreasonably sustain the operations of what 
he defines the ‘decapitalised’ banks. Moreover, these policy-makers’ tools may aggravate 
agency problems, by increasing the incentives of banks to ‘gamble’ with depositors’ 
money and raise in turn the number of bad loans (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 
2002). 
 
2.2 Market structure frictions, bank efficiency and risk 
The other channel through which financial frictions may arise is market structure. 
These occur because of imperfect competition and are especially relevant in light of recent 
events that affected the banking sector at a global level as a consequence of the US 
subprime mortgage crisis. Before deregulation, banking markets were typically 
characterised by the presence of many institutions operating at a non-optimal scale with 
relatively high excess capacity (see the reviews by Berger and Humphrey, 1997 and 
Goddard et al. 2001). Such banks could survive mainly because of the lack of competitive 
pressures and the fact that in some cases domestic authorities were acting as protectors of 
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the banking sectors and had an interest in maintaining a large number of banks in their 
systems.  
Structural and conduct deregulation has had several effects: it has liberalised 
significantly the banking sector3; enhanced potential competition by removing entry 
barriers; and allowed banks to consolidate while offering a wide range of products and 
services. Recent events have demonstrated that financial stability becomes a priority in 
case of serious banking crises. As some institutions have been allowed to carry out M&A 
activities for the benefit of stability, concerns have grown around the possible future 
implications for performance and public policies deriving from increased market power of 
these institutions. 
There are important theoretical arguments on the negative effects of market power 
on banks’ performance and risk. The starting point in the literature is usually Hick’s (1935) 
“quiet life”. This hypothesis essentially recognizes that greater market power is associated 
with lessened efforts by managers to maximise operating efficiency and thus increased 
concentration should bring about a decrease in efficiency.4 Leibenstein (1966) argued that 
inefficiencies are reduced by increased competition as managers respond to the challenge. 
While these explanations assume that the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm holds (at least partially), recent evidence suggests that profitability is not 
necessarily higher in concentrated market (Berger, 1995). In a later study, Berger and 
Hannan (1998) find that banks operating in concentrated markets have an incentive to take 
advantage of market power in pricing not for earning higher profits but to allow costs to 
rise as a consequence of slack management. In other words, their evidence suggests that 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the banking Directives enacted in the EU, as part of the Single Market Programme. 
4 This is because greater market power may generate agency problems and allow managers to pursue their 
own interests (see section 2.1); or, as later argued by Williamson (1963), it may induce them to spend more 
by paying higher wages and/or hire more staff than firms in competitive markets in order to obtain and 
maintain market power (the so-called expense-preference theory) (see Tullock, 1967; Hermalin, 1992) 
Market power can also provide a price “cushion” to inefficient managers by simply allowing managerial 
incompetence to persist without any intention to pursue goals or efforts to obtain market power. 
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increased concentration, if it leads to increased marked power, has a negative impact on 
bank efficiency.5  
The most recent developments in the literature have highlighted the importance of 
measuring bank competition. The New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature 
argues that factors other than market structure and concentration may affect competitive 
behaviour, such as entry/exit barriers and the general contestability of the market (Baumol 
et al., 1982). The novelty of these studies is that they measure the degree of competition 
(e.g. by using the Panzar and Rosse’s H-Statistics and the Lerner index of monopoly 
power) rather than simply inferring it from the concentration ratios that inevitably treat the 
competitive effects of large and small banks equally (for recent reviews, see Berger et al., 
2004; Dick and Hannan, 2009).  
Further developments in the industrial organization theory of banking have shown 
that efficiency is often more important than market power in explaining profitability for 
the US and EU banking markets (Berger, 1995; Goddard et al. 2001; Berger et al. 2004). 
Similarly, recent theories have emphasized the importance of the relationship between 
competition and bank efficiency, as competitive pressures motivate managers to act more 
efficiently (Hart, 1983). Accordingly, in oligopolistic or monopolistic environments banks 
should be characterized by a lower degree of market discipline which in turn results in 
operational inefficiency. Nevertheless, empirical findings indicate that high market 
concentration does not necessarily imply less competition (e.g. Weill, 2004; Casu and 
Girardone, 2006). 
A testable prediction emerging from this type of models is that the lack of market 
discipline in concentrated markets results in a reduction of cost efficiency. In addition to 
testing this link, this paper examines whether low measured cost efficiency is a signal of 
                                                 
5 On the other hand the “efficient-structure” hypothesis assumes a reverse causality between competition and 
efficiency: more efficient firms have lower costs, which in turn lead to higher profits. Therefore, the most 
efficient firms are able to increase their market share, resulting in higher concentration (Demsetz, 1973).  
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poor senior management quality. When managers fail to monitor and control adequately 
the operating costs and when loan portfolio management is weak, the result is typically 
higher numbers of loan loss provisions. In contrast, exogenous imperfections may increase 
loan loss provisions (reducing asset quality) which in turn can cause a decrease in cost 
efficiency. The rationale behind this theory is that the occurrence of loan loss provisions 
implies that bank managers must allocate additional managerial effort and resources 
dealing with these problem loans, which in turn causes decreases in measured cost 
efficiency. Importantly, faced with exogenous events or financial imperfections that distort 
asset quality, even the most cost efficient banks need to expend additional inputs necessary 
to deal with these adverse situations.  
In this paper, we employ a simultaneous equations approach to assess the 
importance of both informational and market structure imperfections. We also allow the 
model specification to account for a possible reverse causation from efficiency to banks’ 
asset quality. The next section illustrates the methodology used for the empirical analysis.  
 
3 The methodological framework 
3.1 The econometric model 
 To test the financial frictions and the efficiency-lending quality hypotheses we use 
the three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach as our modelling framework (see Zellner 
and Theil, 1962). While the SURE6 approach could also be a possibility, the 3SLS is 
considered more appropriate for estimating systems of equations where the endogeneity 
problem cannot be ruled out.  In our model, the endogeneity problem seems to plague our 
system of equations, as the efficiency and lending quality variables appear on both sides of 
the equations. Using the 3SLS we develop instrumental variables for all endogenous 
                                                 
6 SURE is more appropriate for cross-equation error correlation. Our analysis, however, requires addressing 
endogeneity problems, which SURE fails to deal with. 
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variables and obtain consistent estimates for the covariance matrix of the equation 
disturbances. We also perform generalised least squares (GLS) estimations to account for 
the correlation structure in the disturbances across the equations.7 Specifically, the 
estimated system of equations can be written as follows: 
 
ittitititit YEARZLQFFfEFF ,1,11 ),,,( ε+=     (1a) 
ittitititit YEARZFFEFFfLQ ,2,22 ),,,( ε+=     (1b) 
 
where EFF is operating efficiency; FF is financial frictions; LQ is lending quality; Z is a 
vector of explanatory variables; YEAR is a yearly dummy variable and ε is the error term.  
The dependent variable in equation (1a) is the managerial efficiency measure EFF, 
which measures how close the bank is to the estimated efficient frontier (for more details, 
see section 3.2). This equation tests the “financial frictions hypothesis” that various 
informational and market structure frictions have an impact on bank efficiency levels.  
Agency costs frictions reduce bank risk leading to more efficient banking institutions. 
Moreover, banks operating in more competitive environments are also expected to benefit 
from higher levels of efficiency (the “quiet life hypothesis”).  
The dependent variable in equation (1b) is the loan loss provision-to-loans ratio 
(LLP) and proxies for bank lending quality LQ. The higher the LLP variable is, the lower 
the bank lending quality. The assumption is that the greater the volume of bad loans, the 
greater the corresponding provision will be. LLP represents one of the most important and 
commonly used proxies for problem loans in the banking literature (see among others 
Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001; Williams, 2004) and is defined as the net allowances that 
deposit-takers make against bad or impaired loans, based on their judgment as to the 
                                                 
7 For the details on 3SLS see e.g. Greene (2003). 
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likelihood of losses occurring.8 Formally it is the amount a bank charges to operating 
expenses to provide an adequate reserve to cover anticipated losses in the loan portfolio 
from bad loans. Testing the “efficiency-lending quality hypothesis” allows to account for 
the possibility of reverse causation from performance to bad loans using the parameters in 
equation (1b). In particular, we test whether lower cost efficiency levels affect the quality 
of bank output by increasing the number of loan loss provisions.  
We also identify the form of financial frictions that lead to increases in bad loans. 
Indeed various factors can affect asset quality. Inefficient banks might perform poor credit 
screening and monitoring thus adversely affecting the quality of their loan portfolios. 
Similarly, various financial frictions such as the lack of market discipline in concentrated 
markets and moral hazard problems among managers, shareholders and depositors could 
also affect the level of credit risk that banks are willing to undertake, thus resulting in a 
deterioration of banks’ lending quality (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004).   
To account for the first type of financial frictions (which emanate from moral 
hazard concerns) we use the variables in the vector FF of equations (1a and 1b): 
 
),,,( ititititit PRHERFCOVDEPETAFF =     (2) 
 
where ETA is equity to total assets and measures agency problems between shareholders 
and managers. This is the most commonly used proxy for bank capitalisation and indicates 
the degree of risk taken by bank managers as higher leverage increases the risk of 
insolvency which could result in greater borrowing costs (Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Flannery et al., 2004). Higher levels of capitalisation 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that although loan loss provisions ratio is often used to proxy for banks’ lending quality, 
accounting rules may differ across countries. For example, Spanish banks are subject to dynamic forward 
looking rules, while banks in most other euro zone countries are not. We thank an anonymous referee for 
pointing this out to us.  
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may also reflect higher incentives from the shareholders to monitor management, thus 
alleviating the efficiency decline caused by agency problems (Eisenbeis et al., 1999). Yet, 
the bulk of empirical evidence on the moral hazard hypothesis between shareholders and 
managers suggests that higher capital ratios are correlated with greater efficiency (Berger, 
1995; Mester, 1994; 1996; Goddard et al. 2001) and profitability (for example Molyneux 
and Thornton, 1992; Berger, 1995) although empirical evidence on this latter relationship 
is relatively mixed.  
One of the main advances of the present study is that we explicitly take into 
account moral hazard problems between banks and depositors by including a deposit 
insurance variable, COVDEP, in the model (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2005). We expect that a 
high insurance scheme may improve the stability and competition in the banking markets, 
resulting in greater efficiency. Besides stabilising the financial sector, deposit insurance 
and higher levels of capital could incentivise managers to engage in excessively risky 
activities. That is mainly because high coverage limits can reduce depositors’ incentives to 
monitor banks, and encourage excessive risk taking by managers. On the other hand the 
most efficient banks can offer high interest rates to depositors and in turn invest in risky 
assets, trying to earn the money to pay back those high interest rates, which results in 
higher bad loans. Therefore, one would expect a positive relationship between the level of 
coverage limit, the level of capitalisation and the number of bad loans.     
We test the quiet life hypothesis using two broadly accepted market structure 
measures, the Herfindal index (HERF) and the Panzar and Rosse (PR) H-statistic. HERF 
represents market share (in terms of total assets) of every bank in the sample and gives a 
measure of market concentration. Banks in concentrated markets are assumed to benefit 
from low competitive pressure, allowing them to exercise market power and thus earn 
monopolistic profit by e.g. offering lower deposits rates and charging higher loan rates. As 
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emphasised in section 2.2 these assumptions are derived from the traditional SCP theory, 
which posits that banks in concentrated environments are more likely to engage in 
collusive behaviour. It has been shown, however, that concentration is not necessarily 
synonymous of market power if the banks operate efficiently. Therefore, to measure 
market structure frictions we consider the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic (see Section 3.3 for 
the methodological details), which is a proxy of the degree of competition in the banking 
markets. Specifically, the H-statistic represents an attempt to capture banks’ competitive 
conduct rather than market structure. While specifying the expected sign of the HERF 
coefficient can be fairly complicated due to different forces working in opposing 
directions, the above arguments suggest that on balance the relationship between 
competition and bank efficiency is by no means straightforward (see Casu and Girardone, 
2006 and 2009).    
The exogenous variables vector Z1 in the system of equations (1a,b) contains other 
characteristics that are likely to influence cost efficiency, including measures of bank size, 
economic conditions and the regulatory environment. Specifically it is defined as follows: 
 
),,,( 2,,1 itititititit BFREGBDGDPLnTALnTA ∆=Ζ  (3) 
 
 LnTA is the natural logarithm of total assets and measures how bank size 
influences efficiency level. We have also tested the quadratic term of the LNTA variable 
to check for non-linearity in this relationship. The bank size variable is frequently used as 
a proxy for economies or diseconomies of scale although it is a rough indicator because 
economies of scale are exhausted at certain output levels. Bank size may, however, 
influence efficiency levels positively as big banks are able to hold less capital compared to 
their smaller counterparts, and may also be able to have greater portfolio and loan 
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diversification and gain from size advantages (Hughes, Mester and Moon, 2001; Yildirim 
and Philippatos 2007; Altunbas et al., 2007).  
The average annual growth rate of per capita GDP (∆GDP) and branch density 
(BD) comprise a set of environmental variables used to control for local economic 
conditions. A high level of per capita GDP captures the cyclical conditions of the 
macroeconomic environment. Moreover, favourable economic conditions affect the extent, 
depth and quality of financial intermediation and banking services which in turn typically 
lead to more efficient banking institutions. Empirical studies find that countries with 
relatively high GDP growth are characterised by more efficient banking institutions (e.g., 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Schure et al., 2004; Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007). In addition the higher the growth rate of the economy, the easier is for debtors to 
meet their obligations and thus banks can enjoy lower loan loss provisions. Thereby, the 
sign of ∆GDP should be negative suggesting a positive association between ∆GDP and 
bank lending quality (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2001). We define the BD variable as the 
number of branches per squared kilometre, and use it as an indicator of the space 
dimension for each national market. High levels of BD should imply high operating costs 
and extensive banking networks, which in turn may result in lower efficiency levels 
(Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). 
 Another indicator of the economic environment is the differences across countries 
in the degree of openness and regulation pertaining to financial institutions. All countries 
provide some type of prudential regulation to ensure the safety and soundness of their 
banking industry and protect consumers. Nevertheless, poorly designed or inefficient 
regulation may often prove self-defeating.  
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The variable BFREG9 constitutes a proxy for the degree of openness in the banking and 
financial services sector. We obtain this variable from the Heritage foundation indices of 
economic freedom (2004). The grading scale of this indicator reflects whether foreign 
banks and financial services firms are able to operate freely, how difficult it is to open 
domestic banks and other financial services, how heavily regulated is the financial system, 
the presence of state-owned banks, whether the government influence the allocation of 
credit, and whether banks are free to provide customers with insurance and invest in 
securities (and vice versa). A score of 1 in this index indicates negligible government 
involvement in the banking sector while a score of 5 implies very high government control 
with banks operate on primitive basis. This coefficient provides an indication as to whether 
regulation is correlated with bank efficiency and lending quality and if so, to what extent. 
A variety of indicators examining the degree of financial liberalisation have been 
employed in the literature. For example, La Porta et al. (1998; 2000) include traditional 
indicators of common law, creditor rights, rule of law and find that countries with more 
robust investor protection (where agency costs are restricted by the law) have more 
developed capital markets. Also Fries and Taci (2005) use a proxy for the degree of 
economic reform in the transition countries to capture the association between a country’s 
progress in banking reform and cost efficiency. They find that early stages of banking 
reform are significantly associated with a decrease in banking costs and greater cost 
efficiency.    
                                                 
9 The Banking and Finance Freedom (BFREG) is a measure of banking security as well as a measure of 
independence from government control. This component is constructed by determining the extent of 
government regulation of financial services, the extent of state intervention in banks and other financial 
services, the difficulty of opening and operating financial services firms (both domestic and foreign 
individuals), and government influence on the allocation of credit (Heritage Foundation, 2004). This variable 
does not directly capture the protection of investor property rights.  
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Similarly to the explanatory variables vector in equation (3), Z2 contains factors 
that are likely to influence the lending quality including economic conditions, credit risk 
and regulatory environment measures: 
 
),/,( ,,2 itititit BFREGTATLGDP∆=Ζ      (4) 
 
The vector of control variables in the lending quality equation (1b), Z2 contains 
measures of credit risk, economic conditions and regulatory environment. The economic 
and regulatory variables are the annual growth rate of per capita GDP (∆GDP) and the 
banking and finance regulation (BFREG) that have also been included in equation (1a). 
Additionally we also include the ratio of total net loans to total assets (TL/TA) as a proxy 
for credit risk. Banks with strenuous loan growth incentives should face more credit risk, 
which increases the pressures on bank management to efficiently deal with credit risk, thus 
improving lending quality. Previous empirical evidence for the Euro area found a negative 
relationship between credit risk and problem loans, suggesting that bank managers are able 
to evaluate and efficiently manage credit risk (Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007).  
Finally, the set of YEAR dummy variables in both equations (1a,b) inter alia 
controls for other macroeconomic, regulatory and technological changes such as those 
emanating from the continuous process of financial deregulation in Europe.  
 
 
3.2 Measuring efficiency and competition 
The efficiency scores used in our model are constructed using an input-oriented 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology. Originally developed by Charnes et al. 
(1978), DEA employs a linear programming framework and makes some fairly general 
 18
assumptions about the production technology (Ray, 2004), in order to provide an estimate 
of the Farrell (1957) efficiency measure for each bank in the sample.10 In the generic 
situation of n  banks, with each of them consuming m  different inputs to produce s  
different outputs and constant returns to scale, this translates into the following linear 
programming problem being solved n  times; each time for a different bank in the sample.  
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λ
λθ
θλθ
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Xxst
Min
i
i  (5) 
 
where θ  is a scalar, λ  is a vector of ones and finally X  and Y  are the nm×  input and 
ns ×  output matrices respectively. In this context θ  is the efficiency score of each bank 
and is measured relative to an estimate of the true production frontier which is known as 
the best practice frontier. When the value of θ  is unity the bank operates on the efficient 
frontier and is therefore deemed efficient.   
 The efficiency scores are estimated relative to a common best practice frontier by 
pooling the data across countries for each year. In particular, our sample comprises 
commercial banks operating in the EMU area under the assumption that the banks share 
the same technology. Following Berger and Humphrey (1997) we adopt the intermediation 
approach for describing the production process of a banking institution. Therefore, we 
consider labour, physical capital and deposits as inputs to produce loans and other earning 
assets. 
To measure competition we use the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic. This 
statistic allows distinguishing among oligopolistic, competitive and monopolistically 
                                                 
10 For a systematic introduction to DEA methodology, see among others, Ray (2004). 
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competitive markets. It is calculated from a reduced form revenue equations and measures 
the sum of elasticities of total revenue of the firm with respect to the firm’s input prices 
(see for more details, Appendix A1). The H-statistic is a non-structural test, as it assesses 
the competitive behaviour of banks without using information on the structure of the 
banking market.  
If the H-statistic takes the value of zero or a negative value then the competitive 
structure is either a monopoly or a perfect colluding oligopoly. When the H-statistic is 
equal to 1, it indicates perfect competition whereas a value between zero and one indicates 
monopolistic competition. As illustrated by Vesala (1995:p.56), the H-statistics is an 
increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity, that implies that the higher the H 
the less the market power exercised by banks. This suggests that the interpretation of 
market power as a continuous function of the H statistics is not inappropriate (see e.g. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004); Bikker and Haaf (2002); Schaeck et al. (2009).11 Goddard 
and Wilson (2009) advanced further the literature on the measurement of competitive 
conditions in banking by examining the implications of departures from assumed product 
market equilibrium conditions for the estimation of the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic. Delis 
et al. (2008) use non-structural models, namely the conduct parameter method and the 
revenue test, to measure market power in three banking industries. 
Nathan and Neave (1989) point out that this interpretation assumes that the test is 
undertaken on observations that are in long-run equilibrium and we also test for this 
aspect. Table 1 illustrates selected descriptive statistics of the inputs and outputs used in 
the DEA efficiency measurement and the Panzar and Rosse statistic model. In particular, 
we estimate the efficiency using three inputs (labour, physical capital and deposits) to 
                                                 
11 Since the H- statistics only allows us to diagnose between different types of competitive conduct 
consistent with textbook models of market structure, it should not be considered a precise measure 
of competition and thus it should be interpreted with some caution. We thank an anonymous referee 
for pointing out this issue. 
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produce loans and other earning assets. In the Panzar and Rosse model, we capture labour 
costs with the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, deposits costs as the ratio of 
interest expenses to customer and short-term funding (this includes all short- and long-
term deposits and other non-deposit short term funding), and total capital expenses over 
total fixed assets are used to proxy for the input price of capital. Finally, the table also 
presents summary statistics for other bank-specific control variables that are also included 
in the Panzar and Rosse analysis.  
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
3.3 Data  
The dataset used in this study is composed of individual bank data sourced from 
unconsolidated statements of banks operating in the EMU area made available through the 
BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk. The banks we consider are those of Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.12 The 
chosen time span is 1999 to 2004, starting with the implementation of the final stage (stage 
3) of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe, when 12 countries give up 
their national currencies to adopt the euro.  
The initial sample comprises only banks classified as commercial by the 
database.13 We focus on this banking category to minimise the estimation problems a 
heterogeneous sample would create; there are still significant differences in the retail 
                                                 
12 Due to unavailability of data or/and missing values for significant number of banks we excluded Finland, 
Greece and Ireland from our EMU dataset. For similar reasons we exclude from the analysis the effects of 
the Fifth Enlargement (Part I). This occurred in May 2004, when Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were admitted to the EU. The Fifth 
Enlargement (Part II) occurred in January 2007, when Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU and Slovenia 
adopted the Euro single currency. 
13 Since we include only commercial banks, bank holding companies, investment banks and securities 
houses, saving banks, real estate and mortgage banks, non-banking credit institutions, and other specialised 
governmental credit institutions are excluded from the sample.  
 21
market structure among EU countries and in some countries the saving banking sector is 
still partially benefiting from state help.14 The traditional banking services offered by 
commercial banks are relatively homogeneous and comparable across countries which also 
help us ensure a common production technology for the selected banks. Further, 
commercial banks comprise one of the largest segments of depository institutions in all 
European banking markets. We have deflated the data with the consumer price index (CPI) 
and use the euro as the reference currency for reporting them.  
We have also scrutinized the data to avoid double entries, inconsistencies, 
reporting errors and missing values. We ensure that this study deals only with commercial 
banks that primarily engage in traditional lending activities, by eliminating bank-year 
observations with total-loans-to-assets ratios below the 20 percent threshold as well as 
those banks which mainly operate as credit specialists or consider trade or corporate 
finance or provision of asset management and private banking services as their main 
activity.  
Moreover, to ensure credibility of the efficiency indices, considering the sensitivity 
of DEA measurements to the presence of outliers (super-efficient observations) and data 
errors, it becomes crucial to implement some additional method to correct for such 
discrepancies. In the existing banking literature, a number of methodologies have been 
proposed to cope with this problem like the fuzzy clustering strategy (Seaver and Triantis, 
1992, 1995); the super-efficiency model (Andersen and Peterson, 1993); the order-m 
frontiers (Cazals et al., 2002) and the Robust Efficiency Measurements (REM) 
(Kuosmanen and Post, 1999). However, all these approaches are heavily dependent on the 
manual inspection of the data, which is impossible for large samples. More specifically, as 
De Sousa and Stosic (2005) point out, while those methods seems to work fine with 
                                                 
14 For example, until 2005 the German Landesbanks benefited state guarantees that have secured the 
high ratings and have given them access to cheap funding.  
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relatively homogeneous small or moderate datasets, they have severe drawbacks when 
applied to very large and diverse datasets.  
Therefore, in order to deal with potential outliers in a large dataset like the one 
used in the present study we apply the recently proposed Jackstrap methodology (Stosic 
and De Sousa, 2003). The method relies on a combination of Bootstrap and Jackknife re-
sampling techniques “for calculating, for each DMU, the effect produced on the DEA 
efficiency scores of all the other DMUs, when the observed DMU is removed from the 
dataset” (De Sousa and Stosic, 2005; 162). In that way outliers and banks with errors in 
data can be detected and removed from the dataset, as those are expected to show greater 
leverage (influence) than the global average (see Appendix A2 for the details).       
 After implementing the aforementioned screening methods, we obtain an 
unbalanced panel consisting of 2,264 observations of 637 commercial banks for the 
aforementioned 9 EMU counties. We provide the number of bank observations by country 
and year in Table 2. No single country dominates our sample. Germany represents the 
largest group of banks in the sample (approximately 25%), whereas France and Italy are 
the second and third biggest groups (about 24% of total, respectively). The average bank 
size in our sample in terms of total assets as at the end of 2004 is over €15.6 billions, with 
the largest average bank being in Belgium and the smallest located in Luxembourg.  
 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows the variables employed in the model, their definitions and 
summary statistic for the whole sample. The endogenous variables used in our system of 
equations are the estimated cost efficiency and the lending quality, which is captured by 
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans. Financial frictions are controlled using the 
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shareholder’s equity to total assets and the coverage to deposits per capita as proxies for 
informational frictions. Accordingly, market structure frictions are captured by the 
Herfindahl index and the Panzar and Rosse statistic. The table also presents summary 
statistics for the control variables used in our simultaneous equations model.     
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
4. Results 
This section first evaluates the estimated efficiency scores and the measures of 
competition. Then it discusses the results from testing the two main hypotheses: the 
financial frictions hypothesis (Section 4.1) and the efficiency-lending quality hypothesis 
(Section 4.2).  
Figure 1 illustrates the average DEA efficiency scores by year and by country. 
Overall, the results show relatively high cost inefficiency levels of about 20%, which is 
broadly in accordance with previous bank efficiency studies covering Europe (e.g. 
Goddard et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003). Technical 
efficiency displays a decreasing trend (see panel a), peaking in 2001 and then weakening 
over the following years. The (commercial) banking sectors that achieved better operating 
efficiency during the early millennium recession have been the Italian and the Spanish 
ones, as displayed in panel (b).  
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
The results of the H-statistics are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix. They 
reveal that over the period under study the EMU banking markets have been characterised 
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by monopolistic competition (H is equal to 0.79)15, which is also in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Weill, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2006; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). 
The main results for the hypotheses tests derived from the simultaneous 
estimations are reported in Tables 4-5. We show estimates of the system of equations 
(1a,b) resulting from applying the 3SLS to the full sample of banks in a panel over the 
period 1999-2004. For convenience, we first discuss the results for the financial frictions 
hypothesis, using equation (1a) and then review the findings for reverse causality from 
efficiency to lending quality using equation (1b). 
 
4.1 Financial frictions hypothesis results 
Estimates from the financial frictions hypothesis derived from the simultaneous 
estimation are reported in Table 4. As previously mentioned (section 3.2) the dependent 
variable used in this equation is the DEA efficiency scores (EFF). The results uncover 
strong statistical evidence in support for both financial frictions (agency costs and quiet 
life) hypotheses that informational frictions and low competition levels affect the 
efficiency levels and the quality of bank output.  
 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
 
Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis that higher capital 
ratios and deposit insurance coverage are associated with higher efficiency. In particular, 
we find that ETA is positively and significantly related to EFF suggesting that high levels 
                                                 
15 The vast majority of countries are found in long-term equilibrium with the exception of Belgium and 
France. We nevertheless did conduct a number of robustness checks following e.g. De Bandt and Davis 
(2000); Claessens and Laeven (2004) and Schaeck et al (2009). More specifically, we exclude those 
countries that fail to meet the equilibrium test at the 5% significance level, and found that our main results 
were not affected. Furthermore, we compare our balanced panel to the unbalanced sample of all banks that 
are reported by BankScope but may not report information for every year. Again, the results were virtually 
unchanged. 
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of capitalisation may prevent moral hazard and alleviate informational frictions, leading to 
more efficient financial institutions. Specifically, higher capital may reflect greater 
incentives from the shareholders to monitor managers. This result is in accordance with 
previous findings in the banking literature (see among others, Berger, 1995; Mester, 1996; 
Eisenbeis et al, 1999; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). Moreover, the result of a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between efficiency and the level of deposit 
coverage limits (COVDEP) indicates that high coverage limits stabilise the banking sector 
by reducing the risk of bank runs, which in turn enhances the efficiency of the banking 
institutions. High COVDEP protects small depositors who lack the resources to evaluate 
the soundness of banks, and also enhance rivalry by allowing small banks to compete for 
depositors with their larger counterparts (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002).  
The latter argument can also be confirmed by the findings on the relationship 
between efficiency and market competition, documented by a positive and statistically 
significant sign for the PR H-statistic coefficient. This result lends support to the quiet life 
hypothesis and the lack of market discipline in monopoly or oligopolistic markets (Hicks, 
1935). Thus in line with earlier research in the banking area, under the presence of 
informational frictions, higher competition may serve as the most effective tool in 
fostering efficiency levels (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). Competitive pressures 
motivate managers to operate closely to their production frontier, and also provide the 
principals with relevant information to monitor the agents’ activities (Hart, 1983). On the 
other hand, the results show no relationship between cost efficiency and problem loans for 
commercial banks, which is also in accordance with previous findings for Europe (e.g., 
Williams, 2004), and in marked contrast with US findings (Berger and De Young, 1997).     
 Turning to the exogenous variables in equation (1a) we observe that when 
controlling for other factors, banks operating under more open frameworks typically 
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achieve higher efficiency levels. The variable that captures the degree of openness is not 
pronounced over time but it is significant across countries. Indeed, one would expect that 
when financial intermediaries operate in a relatively deregulated environment they can 
engage in competitive policies and achieve the high levels of efficiency required to remain 
competitive. Moreover, excessively restrictive regulatory frameworks may distort bank 
incentives leading to the undertaking of risky investments. Therefore, our evidence 
broadly suggests that bank management may be more predisposed to risky investment 
behaviour in contexts characterised by policies that constrain banks’ degree of openness 
thus resulting in an inefficient resources allocation process. This conjecture is further 
confirmed in Table 5 (see section 4.2 below) that shows that the sign of the BFREG 
coefficient is positively and significantly associated with problem loans (LQ).  
Finally, as in most cases efficiency is positively related to bank size, which is 
documented by a positive and statistically significant sign for the coefficient of the 
quadratic term of Log (TA), implying a non-linear relationship between bank size and 
efficiency. This result indicates that big banks are able to have greater portfolio and loan 
diversification compared to their smaller counterparts, thereby gaining from size 
advantages, which in turn implies greater efficiency levels. This finding is also consistent 
with the results of previous studies, for instance, Altunbas et al. (2007) and Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007). 
 
4.2 Efficiency-Lending Quality hypothesis results 
Table 5 reports the results from the reverse causality test running from efficiency to 
lending quality using equation (1b), i.e. the efficiency-lending quality hypothesis. Overall, 
in accordance with previous studies on European banks, the results lend support to the 
hypothesis that low measured cost efficiency is a signal of poor asset quality. In particular, 
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the EFF coefficient is negative at the 1% level of significance, indicating that inefficient 
banks fail to practice adequate control or monitor operating costs and loan portfolio 
management is weak, thus reducing asset quality.  
 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
 
Williams (2004) finds that European bank managers exhibit characteristics of 
inefficient management which in turn results in poor quality loans. Taking into account the 
results of no relationship between problem loans and cost efficiency in equation (1a), our 
empirical findings on the reverse causality correspond to those of Williams (2004) in that 
the relationship between cost efficiency and banks’ lending quality does not run in both 
directions. Notably, the results suggest that low efficiency levels constitute a signal of poor 
quality loans, whereas the opposite relationship does not occur for Euro zone commercial 
banks.  
The financial frictions vector results indicate a positive relationship between the 
level of capitalisation, coverage limits, competition and the number of bad loans. Bank 
managers with incentives distorted by moral hazard tend to substitute riskier assets for 
safer ones at the expense of creditors’ welfare. This finding is in line with Altunbas et al. 
(2007) who also find that banks with higher problem loans tend to have higher capital 
levels. Thus, as Jensen’s theory underlines, the role of managers as agents for shareholders 
is fraught with conflicts of interest which can adversely affect asset quality.  
Furthermore, besides enhancing the efficiency of the financial sector, an insurance 
scheme may also worsen banks’ lending quality. That is, high COVDEP can inhibit any 
form of monitoring on the depositors’ part, resulting in lack of market discipline. 
Similarly, banks can invest in excessively risky assets, resulting in an increase in the 
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number of bad loans. This kind of agency problems may increase the incentives of both 
banks and depositors to engage in imprudent banking activities, being confident that if the 
risky loans do not pay off, deposit insurance protects their depositors (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Kane, 2002). Accordingly, banks operating in more competitive environments (as captured 
by the H-statistics coefficient) may engage in strategies of increased loan growth rates as 
they actively seek to capture a bigger share of the loan market, resulting in higher problem 
loans. In particular, the H-statistic coefficient is found to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  
With respect to the control variables in equation (1b), we observe that less open 
banking and financial frameworks in general and tighter regulation in particular may result 
in deteriorated lending quality for banks. The sign of the BFREG coefficient is positively 
and significantly associated with problem loans. Therefore, as in equation (1a), the degree 
of openness affects the efficiency and the riskiness of the loan portfolio of the banking 
institutions operating in the eurozone. Our findings also show a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the proxy for credit risk TL/TA and banks’ problem loans. 
This suggests that banks with more loan-intensive balance sheets have higher credit risk. 
Higher credit risk, however, may also increase the pressures on bank management to 
produce higher quality loans, thus reducing the number of bad loans. This is also in line 
with previous findings for European banks (see Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007).  
We test for the presence of two types of financial frictions in the euro area banking 
system pertaining to information and market structure respectively. The first type of 
frictions is consistent with the agency costs hypothesis between managers-shareholders 
and banks-depositors, while the second type of frictions corresponds to the “quiet life 
hypothesis”. Our results show that both agency costs and lax market discipline in 
concentrated markets precipitate a negative effect in banks’ operational efficiency. To the 
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extent that these factors prove detrimental to bank efficiency, there may be various 
potential implications for business finance, including adverse pricing strategies in terms of 
e.g. higher loan rates; credit allocation problems as well as credit rationing.  
The findings that higher capital ratios impact negatively on moral hazard and on 
informational frictions between managers and shareholders has direct policy implications, 
which are particularly timely when the redesigning of the financial architecture is 
considered. Our results imply that higher deposit insurance schemes can stabilise the 
system of financial intermediation, reduce bank risk and promote competition among 
banks. This in turn enhances the efficiency in the banking industry with the 
aforementioned implications for businesses. We also find that higher levels of competition 
appear to serve as the most effective remedy for the ‘quiet life’ effect of slack management 
(“quiet life hypothesis”). Thus, regulatory measures should be designed in a way that does 
not hinder competition. This policy implication is corroborated by the finding that policies 
aimed at constraining banks’ openness may ultimately undermine the efficiency of 
financial institutions by directing the choices of bank management towards riskier 
investments. This is also in accordance with the deposit insurance rationale that high 
coverage limits promote competition and allow small banks to compete with larger 
institutions for depositors, by alleviating concerns about the fragility of small banks.  
Moreover, we explore the possible existence and the implications of reverse 
causality from efficiency to banks’ asset quality. We term this relationship the efficiency-
lending quality hypothesis. To our knowledge there is no other work explicitly focusing on 
this linkage. Our findings suggest that low efficiency levels are a signal of poor asset 
quality loans and that a unidirectional relationship exists from cost efficiency to lending 
quality. This result contrasts with previous findings for the US banking industry which 
suggest the existence of an intertemporal relationship between loan quality and cost 
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efficiency that run in both directions (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) but it is in line with 
previous findings for the EU (Williams, 2004). More specifically, our results indicate that 
more inefficient banks with relatively higher capital ratios and deposit insurance coverage 
are more likely to have worst loan quality. In other words, moral hazard behaviours and 
the ‘security’ that deposit insurance offers to both banks and depositors can encourage 
excessive risk-taking strategies. Moreover, bank loan quality is also associated with more 
competitive banking markets. Competitive pressures induce banks to engage in strategies 
of increased loan growth rates, as they actively seek to capture a bigger share of the loan 
market, and may result in more problem loans.  
Bank behaviour in general and efficient banking specifically affects firm behaviour 
in the context of broader macroeconomic models focusing on the transmission of monetary 
policy. Thus, in addition to the direct implications for financial intermediaries, our results 
can be useful to macroeconomists whose analyses indirectly impact finance and business. 
For example, as Kashyap and Stein (1995) show in 1991 in the US, eight out of ten small 
and medium-sized firms were dependent on banks for their external finance. Central banks 
have been concerned about the distortionary effects of financial frictions in the monetary 
transmission mechanism especially in the context of the credit and bank lending channels 
(e.g., see Bean et al., 2002).16 Nevertheless, one of the major weaknesses of the current 
consensus of the macroeconomic models (the so-called Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Models) used by central banks and other institutions for policy analysis is that 
they typically fail to incorporate a fully fledged financial sector that specifically captures 
the various forms of imperfections.  Our empirical results provide some guidance to those 
who want to gauge the type of financial frictions that emerge as relevant in the euro area.   
 
                                                 
16 For evidence regarding the existence of a bank lending channel see for example Bernanke and Blinder 
(1992) and Bernanke et al. (1999). 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by empirically examining the 
impact of financial frictions on the efficiency and lending quality of banking institutions 
operating in the eurozone between 1999 and 2004. The efficiency scores used in our 
models are constructed using an input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis methodology. 
We consider two related channels through which financial frictions may arise, namely 
informational and market structure imperfections. In addition, we allow for a possible 
reverse causation from efficiency to banks’ asset quality. We produce evidence that 
validates the presence of financial frictions consistent with both the agency-costs and 
market-structure hypotheses. The said financial frictions precipitate a negative effect in 
banks’ operational efficiency that could result in potentially harmful implications for 
business finance, including adverse pricing strategies, credit allocation problems as well as 
credit rationing.  
We find that higher capital ratios may prevent moral hazard and alleviate 
informational frictions between managers and shareholders, leading to more efficient 
financial institutions. Higher deposit insurance schemes can reduce bank risk and promote 
competition among banks, thus enhancing the efficiency in the banking industry. 
Moreover, financial institutions operating in a competitive environment are less vulnerable 
to the ‘quiet life’ effect of slack management and display higher efficiency levels. Our 
findings also validate what we call the “efficiency-lending quality hypothesis” which has 
direct implications for policy-makers/regulators and businesses alike since low efficiency 
levels can signal poor asset quality loans. From a public policy perspective, understanding 
the relationships among financial frictions, bank performance and bank lending quality is 
important for promoting the safety and soundness of the financial sector, especially in an 
era when almost every aspect of the financial systems’ institutional design is under 
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reconsideration. Our evidence suggests a crucial role of deposit insurance and capital 
ratios in mitigating informational problems and reducing risk. Yet there is no doubt that 
the recent financial markets turmoil puts this discussion on a new basis. Our analysis 
covers a sample that falls within the “great moderation” period. The next challenge is to 
consider alternative banks’ risk taking incentives, distinguish between the impact of 
different types of regulatory policies, and relate the role of government safety nets with 
systemic stability in the post-crisis period. 
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Appendix A: 
A.1 Measuring Bank Competition: the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic 
 The degree of competition in the Euro zone banking markets and the long-run 
equilibrium tests for each country are estimated using the H-statistic. This is calculated 
using the following reduced form revenue estimations (run on a panel data set) for each 
country:  
 
1 1, 2 2, 3 3, 1 2
3 4 5
ln ln ln ln ln ln
             + ln ln ln
it it it it it it
it it it it
TR P P P EQAST AST
LOANAST CASHDEP OBSAST
β β β γ γ
γ γ γ ε
= + + + + +
+ + +       (A.1) 
 
for Tt ,...1= , where T is the number of periods observed and Ii ,...1= , where I is the total 
number of banks. The dependent variable itTR  is the ratio of total revenue to total assets. 
We use three inputs (labour, capital and deposits) to describe the production process of 
banks: 1ln P  is the average cost of labour (personnel expenses/total assets)
17; 2ln P  is the 
average cost of deposits (interest expenses/customer and short term funding); and 
finally 3ln P  is the average cost of capital (total capital expenses/total fixed assets).  
 Several bank-specific control variables are also included in the regression to 
control for potential differences in costs, size, risk, structure and product mix. Specifically, 
EQASTln is the ratio of equity to total assets (to control differences in risk propensity); 
ASTln  is the logarithm of total assets (to control for potential size effects); and 
LOANASTln is the ratio of total loans to total assets, which is expected to be positively 
related to the dependent variable. Moreover, CASHDEPln is the ratio of cash and due 
from institutions to total deposits (included to capture differences in the deposit mix). 
                                                 
17 Due to lack of data on the number of employees for many banks in our sample, we use personnel expenses 
to total assets as an indicator of unit labour costs. 
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Finally, OBSASTln is equal to OBS activities over total assets (to control for differences 
in the business mix). 
 Equation (A.1) is estimated by running a panel data set of banks with fixed 
effects18 thus itε  includes a systematic (time varying) and bank-specific component. The 
H-statistic is calculated from the estimation of (A.1) as:  
∑
=
=
3
1j
jH β       (A.2) 
 
 Given that the PR model is only valid if the market is in equilibrium, we also 
undertake the tests on observations that are in long-run equilibrium. Following Claessens 
and Laeven (2004), the equilibrium test is performed by recalculating equation (A1) after 
replacing the dependent variable (total revenue over total assets) with the natural log of 
returns on assets (ROA). Thus, we estimate the following equation for each country: 
 
itititit
itititititit
OBSASTCASHDEPLOANAST
ASTEQASTPPPROA
εγγγ
γγβββ
+++
+++++=
lnlnln
lnlnlnlnlnln
543
21,33,22,11    (A.3) 
 
 Specifically the dependent variable is computed as )1ln(' ROAROA += in order to 
be adjusted for small and negative values due to banks’ losses in any year. We define the 
equilibrium test as ∑
=
=
3
1j
jE β  and test whether 0=E using the F statistic.19  
 
 
                                                 
18 The choice of the fixed effects estimators is confirmed by the implementation of the Hausman test and it is 
in line with previous studies (Claessen and Laeven, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 2006). 
19 As Claessens and Laeven (2004) point out, in equilibrium ROA should not be related to input prices.  
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A.2 JackStrap Methodology   
To deal with the sensitivity of DEA measurements to the presence of potential 
outliers and data errors, especially when working with relatively large datasets we estimate 
the DEA efficiency scores by applying the “Jackstrap” methodology (Stosic and De Sousa, 
2003). This methodology combines Bootstrap and Jackknife re-sampling techniques to 
reduce the effect of outliers and possible errors in the dataset. The method is based on 
calculating the effect of the presence of each bank in the sample on the efficiency scores of 
all the other banks using: 
 
            
           (A.4) 
 
 
where κθ  are the original efficiency scores; *kjθ are the recalculated efficiency scores after 
removing each bank one by one; and Kj ,...,1= represents the removed bank.  
This approach quantifies the effect that the removal of a bank would have on the 
efficiency scores of the remaining banks in the dataset. In that way outliers and banks with 
errors in data can be detected and removed from the dataset. 
 
1
)(
,1
2*
−
−
=
∑
≠=
K
K
jkk
kkj
j
θθ
l
 46
Appendix B: Table B1 
Panzar and Rosse competition measure (H-statistic)  
Dependent 
variable: total 
revenue/total 
assets 
Countries 
Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain 
P1 0.576*** 0.280*** -0.105*** 0.409*** 0.399*** 0.240* 0.040 0.242 0.260*** 
  [0.112] [0.086] [0.028] [0.040] [0.033] [0.136] [0.077] [0.205] [0.046] 
P2 0.331*** 0.551*** 0.301*** 0.401*** 0.305*** 0.612*** 0.681*** 0.514*** 0.444*** 
  [0.046] [0.040] [0.017] [0.021] [0.019] [0.059] [0.031] [0.096] [0.026] 
P3 0.031 0.028 -0.049*** 0.037** -0.006 -0.075* 0.019 0.056 0.051* 
  [0.050] [0.026] [0.018] [0.014] [0.011] [0.041] [0.026] [0.061] [0.027] 
EQAST -0.011 0.206** -0.036 -0.086** -0.076** 0.104 0.064 -0.023 0.158*** 
  [0.087] [0.098] [0.037] [0.041] [0.029] [0.081] [0.059] [0.189] [0.050] 
TA 0.003 0.066 -0.221*** 0.064** -0.063*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.094 0.080* 
  [0.087] [0.068] [0.041] [0.032] [0.023] [0.090] [0.046] [0.138] [0.046] 
LOANAST 0.061 -0.018 0.055 0.081*** -0.002 -0.149** 0.100* -0.202 0.015 
  [0.060] [0.032] [0.035] [0.028] [0.044] [0.065] [0.054] [0.230] [0.037] 
CASHDEP 0.021 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.011 0.035 -0.023 -0.090** 0.007 
  [0.023] [0.026] [0.009] [0.009] [0.013] [0.033] [0.019] [0.043] [0.017] 
OBSTA 0.032 0.036 0.005 -0.010 0.034*** -0.076 0.008 0.139** -0.117*** 
  [0.021] [0.027] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.048] [0.024] [0.059] [0.024] 
CONS 1.198** -0.516 -0.292 0.245 0.791*** 0.019 -0.550 0.952 -1.244*** 
  [0.570] [0.643] [0.340] [0.257] [0.220] [0.623] [0.359] 1.351 [0.361] 
H-Statistic 0.938 0.859 0.147 0.847 0.698 0.777 0.740 0.812 0.755 
F test (Hstat=0) 61.670 76.250 16.550 396.620 387.490 26.790 77.330 9.770 189.450 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 
F test (Hstat=1) 0.270 2.050 563.430 13.060 72.160 2.180 9.530 0.520 19.750 
Prob>F 0.608 0.158 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.149 0.006 0.474 0.000 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                 
Note: P1= average cost of labour (personnel expenses/total assets), P2= average cost of deposits (interest expenses/customer and short term funding), P3= average 
cost of capital (total capital expenses/total fixed assets), EQAST= equity/assets, TA= total assets, LOANAST= loans/assets, CASHDEP= cash and due from 
institutions/total deposits, OBSTA= OBS activities/assets, CONS= constant term. With the exception of factor prices all variables are expressed in logs.  
Standard errors in brackets.  
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  Table 1 
Selected Descriptive Statistics of Dataset and Inputs and Outputsa  
Mean; Median and Standard Deviations for EMU banks  
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
 
Median 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 1999 2004 1999 2004 1999 2004 
Cost Efficiency       
Inputs       
Personnel expenses 92.69 
 
121.2 
 
11.97 
 
16.199 
 
350.4 
 
443.1 
 
Other Administrative expenses 68.85 
 
91.97 
 
9.1 
 
13.8 
 
273.5 
 
324.2 
 
Interest expenses 332.66 
 
362.53 
 
21.6 
 
24.6 
 
1,547.2 
 
1,543.9 
 
Outputs           
Total Loans 4,329 
 
7,095.3 
 
435 
 
714.9 
 
17,260 
 
26,698 
 
Total Other Earning Assets 4,267 
 
6,918.4 
 
255 
 
325.2 
 
22,062 
 
37,139 
 
Panzar &  Rosse H-Statistic       
Dependent variable       
itTR =Total Revenue/Total Assets 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Inputs       
1P = Personnel expenses/Total assets 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
2P = Interest expenses/Customer & Short-
term funding 
0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.41 
3P =Total capital expenses / Total fixed 
assets 
4.3 7.36 1.38 1.91 20.44 
 
24.72 
Bank Specific control variables       
EQAST = Equity/Total assets 8.85 9.28 6.64 7.10 8.03 8.72 
AST = Log Total assets 10323.
84 
19015.
68 
1035.
80 
1389.0
0 
45262.1
3 
80360.4
7 
LOANAST = Total Loans/Total Assets 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.60 0.21 0.24 
CASHDEP =Cash and due from 
Institutions/Total deposits 
0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.14 
OBSAST =OBS/Total assets 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.47 0.42 
a Unless otherwise stated, figures are in mil. Euros. 
Source: Bankscope and own calculations. 
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Table 2 
Data Frequency Distribution by Country and Year 
 
  Austria Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Total 
Number of bank observations 164 71 551 562 549 39 37 62 229 2264 
Observations by year           
1999 27 17 112 109 100 9 7 13 43 437 
2000 29 17 103 88 83 9 6 11 38 384 
2001 26 9 102 93 95 7 6 10 43 391 
2002 30 9 90 97 85 7 6 10 39 373 
2003 27 9 80 95 90 4 6 10 37 358 
2004 25 10 64 80 96 3 6 8 29 321 
Total Assets on average           
(as of end 2004 in € mil.) 3,166.12 44,640.06 21,962.15 20,487.14 9,352.58 983.10 1,400.38 14,380.62 13,757.08 15,555.46 
 
Source: Bankscope, “JackStrap”method (see Appendix A2). 
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Table 3 
Variables Employed in the Model Estimation: Mean, Median and Standard 
Deviations for 1999-2004a  
 
Symbol Definition         Mean Median St.Dev. 
         
Endogenous Variables 
         
EFF Cost Efficiency measure using the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) methodology (VRS) 
0.792 0.828 0.188 
 
LQ Loan Loss Provisions / Total Loans   0.009 0.005 0.024 
         
Financial Frictions variables 
Informational Frictions 
ETA Shareholder's Equity / Total Assets 9.055 6.923 7.942 
COVDEP Coverage / Deposits per Capita 3.85 2.18 3.42 
         
Market Structure Frictions 
HERF Herfindahl index of local market concentration 0.188 0.198 0.093 
PR Degree of competition by Panzar & Rosse H-statistic 0.634 0.740 0.285 
         
Other Bank Characteristics 
LnTA Logarithm of Total Assets 7.148 6.878 1.843 
TL/TA Total Loans-net / Total Assets 0.586 0.588 0.202 
         
Economic and Regulatory Variables 
∆GDP Annual Growth rate of per capita GDP 0.015 0.016 0.013 
BD Branch Density as the ratio of Branches / 2Km  0.172 0.136 0.076 
BFREG Banking and Finance Regulation 2.493 3.000 0.549 
YEAR Dummy variable for each year  Freq. % of observations  
YEAR(99) = 1 in 1999; =0 otherwise  437 19.30   
YEAR(00) = 1 in 2000; =0 otherwise  384 16.96   
YEAR(01) = 1 in 2001; =0 otherwise  391 17.27   
YEAR(02) = 1 in 2002; =0 otherwise  373 16.48   
YEAR(03) = 1 in 2003; =0 otherwise  358 15.81   
YEAR(04) = 1 in 2004; =0 otherwise  321 14.18   
                  
a All financial variables measured in millions Euros. Annual GDP growth is measured at constant 1995 market 
prices.    
Sources: AMECO, Bankscope, Heritage Foundation and own calculations. 
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Table 4 
Financial frictions hypotheses results using equation (1a) 
(EFF as the dependent variable) 
 
 
 Method: 3SLS  
Years:1999-2004  Equation (1a) 
Dep. Variable: EFF  
   
 Const. 0.828*** 
   
Agency costs hypothesis ETA 0.0014** 
 COVDEP 0.0075*** 
   
Quiet life hypothesis HERF 0.058 
 PR H-Statistic 0.067** 
   
Lending quality hypothesis LQ -0.672 
   
Z1 LnTA -0.032** 
 LnTA 2  0.0035*** 
 ∆GDP 0.779 
 BD -0.154 
 BFREG -0.036** 
   
Year dummies YEAR(2000) 0.0102 
 YEAR(2001) 0.051*** 
 YEAR(2002) 0.015 
 YEAR(2003) -0.029 
 YEAR(2004) -0.026* 
   
Goodness of fit Observations 2,264 
 “R-sq” 0.1430 
 
 
Notes:  
1.Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels, respectively 
2. HERF= Herfindahl index; H-Statistic= Panzar and Rosse H-Statistic; ETA= Shareholder’s equity/Total 
Assets; COVDEP= Coverage/Deposits per capita; LQ= Loan loss provisions/Total loans; LnTA= Logarithm 
of Total Assets; LnTA 2 = Quadratic term of Total Assets; ∆GDP= Annual Growth rate of per capita GDP; 
BD= Branch Density; BFREG= Banking and Finance Regulation. 
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Table 5 
Efficiency-Lending Quality hypothesis results using equation (1b) 
(LLP/TL as the dependent variable) 
 
 Method: 3SLS  
Years:1999-2004  Equation (1b) 
Dep. Variable: LLP/TL  
   
 Const. 0.010 
   
Efficiency-lending quality 
hypothesis 
EFF -0.028*** 
   
Agency costs hypothesis ETA 0.0003*** 
 COVDEP 0.001* 
   
Quiet life hypothesis HERF 0.013 
 PR H-Statistic 0.012*** 
   
Z2 ∆GDP -0.039 
 TL/TA -0.008*** 
 BFREG 0.005*** 
   
Year dummies YEAR(2000) 0.0015 
 YEAR(2001) 0.0017 
 YEAR(2002) 0.0017 
 YEAR(2003) 0.0016 
 YEAR(2004) -0.001 
   
Goodness of fit Observations 2,264 
 “R-sq” 0.0532 
Notes:  
1.Statistically significant at the *10%, **5% and ***1% levels, respectively 
2. EFF= Cost Efficiency; HERF= Herfindahl index; H-Statistic= Panzar & Rosse H-Statistic; ETA= 
Shareholder’s equity/Total Assets; COVDEP= Coverage/Deposits per Capita; ∆GDP= Annual Growth rate of 
per capita GDP; TL/TA= Total Loans/Total Assets; BFREG= Banking and Finance Regulation. 
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Figure 1: 
Technical efficiency scores by year and country  
in selected EMU countries (1999-2004) 
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